11

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES OF NON-TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY

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1   Introduction

When Solly Msimanga, the former Democratic Alliance (DA) mayor of Tshwane, made his maiden official visit to Taipei in Taiwan in December 2016, both the national government and the ruling party accused him of undermining the integrity of South Africa's foreign policy by transgressing the One-China policy in which Pretoria's diplomatic rapport with Beijing is anchored. In an attempt to calm what had quickly turned into a party-political storm, the mayor would go out of his way to argue that his visit to Taipei did not contravene the One-China policy, including writing to the Chinese embassy to explain that his trip was nothing more than a city-to-city engagement focused solely on exploring possibilities for cooperation on good governance and business.[1] Msimanga's explanation seemed to have disarmed his detractors at the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and the African National Congress (ANC). Yet, the controversy and political blame game that accompanied this incident raised fundamental questions about the management of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy, with specific reference to the efficacy of the institutional framework for harnessing the opportunities and mitigating the risks associated with the growing salience of sub-state and non-state actors on the diplomatic scene.

The post-Cold War world into which democratic South Africa was born has increasingly moved away from the neat demarcation between the domestic and foreign spheres of socio-economic and political life, and the corresponding narrow conception of foreign policy and diplomacy along statist lines.[2] With the advent of neoliberal globalisation and greater

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1   *ENCA*, 'UPDATE: Tshwane mayor breaks silence on Taiwan trip', 11 January 2017.

2   However, in the past decade there has been significant backlash against globalisation and its effects on national autonomy, particularly in Europe and North America, giving

interdependence between societies and economies, the agenda of global diplomacy has changed dramatically, and so have the actors and modes of diplomatic interaction. These changes have challenged traditional assumptions about the conduct of foreign policy, with many states now finding it increasingly imperative to adapt their foreign policy thinking and practices to new global dynamics.

This chapter analyses the manifestation of the changing diplomatic practice in the South African context, with a specific focus on the transnational involvement of a cast of non-state and sub-state actors, and reflects on the implications of this trend for the conduct of the country's future foreign policy. We argue that while there has been an explosion of diplomatic activity in the post-apartheid dispensation on the part of non-traditional actors such as parliament, sub-national governments, private and state-owned businesses, and an array of civil society actors, South Africa's foreign policy machinery has generally remained out of sync with this changing diplomatic landscape. The shortcomings in rethinking and adapting the country's foreign policy architecture to new diplomatic realities means that Pretoria is yet to harness fully the expertise, resources, and transnational linkages of these 'new' foreign policy actors. As the controversy over Mayor Msimanga's 2016 Taiwan visit suggests, the lack of a whole-of-system approach to the formulation and implementation of South Africa's foreign policy also exposes the country to the risk of a future foreign policy fragmentation. This is the more so in the context of a growing dispersion of political power away from the ANC, and the increasing salience of cities and other sub-state and non-state actors in a globalising world economy.

Our argument is developed in three sections. We begin by outlining the conceptual framework of the analysis, which draws on notions such as non-traditional diplomacy, catalytic diplomacy, and complex interdependence to unpack the nature, significance and drivers of the changing global diplomatic environment. In the second section, we examine the trends, issues, challenges, and lessons learnt from the diplomatic involvement of an array of South African sub-state and non-state actors over the past two decades and half. We conclude the chapter by drawing on Brian Hocking's notion of integrative diplomacy to make the case for a national diplomatic system in South Africa, which recognises, promotes and harnesses in a proactive and effective manner the international interests and capabilities of a variety of sub-state and non-state actors.

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rise to nationalist politics in Western democracies such as the US, UK and France.

2   Making sense of the new agendas, actors, and modes in a changing diplomatic environment

The end of apartheid in South Africa coincided with major global geopolitical and economic changes that would transform significantly the conception and practice of foreign policy and diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US oversaw the construction of a new global liberal order that would turn out to be as interventionist as it was integrationist, thus eroding some of the key principles and norms that had underpinned the traditional Westphalian inter-state system.[3] On the one hand, the spread of liberal democratic principles and human rights norms challenged the institution of sovereignty in international politics and altered in a fundamental way 'the relationship between the state, the citizen and the international community'.[4] On the other hand, the post-war restructuring of global capitalism under the banner of neoliberal globalisation has not only contributed to undermining the integrity and authority of the state, but has also increasingly questioned its legitimacy and capacity to represent and protect the interests of a diverse set of globally integrated sub-state and non-state actors.[5] The dynamics of these global changes and their significance for the conduct of foreign policy have been explained from multiple perspectives, using different conceptual tools.

For James Rosenau, the changing global environment has given rise to a new and wider political space, characterised by the convergence of domestic and foreign interests and issues, and exhibiting both integration and fragmentation tendencies. Managing this 'frontier', according to Rosenau, is no longer the exclusive privilege and responsibility of sovereign states, as was the case in the traditional inter-state system. A host of territorial and non-territorial spheres of authority (SOA), including intergovernmental and supranational organisations, sub-national governments (SNG), multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and different forms of transnational networks, have become equally significant in governing this new political space.[6]

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3   Ikenberry GJ, 'Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the dilemmas of liberal world order', *Perspectives on Politics*, 7, 1, 2009.

4   Hurrell A, 'Narratives of emergence: Rising powers and the end of the Third World?', *Revista de Economia Politica*, 33, 2, 2013, p. 208.

5   Rhodes RA, 'The hollowing out of the state: The changing nature of the public service in Britain', *The Political Quarterly*, 6, 2, 1994, pp. 138–151; Barrow CW, 'The return of the state: Globalization, state theory, and the new imperialism', *New Political Science*, 27, 2, 2005.

6   Rosenau JN, *Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 39–41.

Two decades earlier, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye had introduced the notion of complex interdependence to offer a similar explanation of ongoing changes in the structure and processes of world politics. With intensified globalisation and interdependence, Keohane and Nye observed significant changes in the agenda, actors and modes of engagement in world politics. In the first instance, the traditional preoccupation with military security in the diplomatic agenda has increasingly been supplanted with so-called issues of low politics such as environmental protection, public health, and economic development, which had hitherto been dealt with at the domestic level. The internationalisation of the domestic policy agenda has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the number of actors with major incentives to engage in world affairs. Likewise, new forms of transnational linkages have emerged alongside traditional modes of inter-state diplomacy, reflecting both the complexity of the agenda of modern diplomacy and the recognition that addressing emerging global challenges such as climate change, human trafficking, as well as rising poverty and inequality requires cooperation and collaboration among state and non-state actors operating at different levels and with varying degrees of capacities.[7]

In his writings on the implications of the changing global environment for the character and behaviour of states, Brian Hocking identifies the emergence of a 'catalytic' state, whose sovereignty has increasingly been perforated.[8] Having lost the capacity to function as an integral whole, this new state now relies on forming partnerships with other state and non-state entities within and outside its borders in order to navigate effectively the complexities of the new diplomatic environment. For Hocking, the multi-layered diplomacy that results from these processes of adaption is not defined by a strict hierarchy of actors, issues or modes of engagement, neither is it based on a logic of control and exclusion. What distinguishes this new form of diplomacy is the emphasis on creating or accessing diverse linkages, which cut across multiple levels and actors, depending on the policy issues, interests, and capacity of the actors concerned.[9] Importantly, Hocking makes the case that the diplomatic involvement of this 'new' cast of actors should not be interpreted as an affront on the primacy of states in foreign policy. It should instead be understood as an

7   Keohane R & JS Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977.

8   Duchacek I, 'Perforated sovereignties: Towards a typology of new actors in international relations', in Michelmann J & P Soldatos (eds), *Federalism and International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp. 1–33.

9   Hocking B, *Localising Foreign Policy: Non-central Governments and Multilayered Diplomacy*. London: Macmillan, 1993.

expansion of the foreign policy process, which demonstrates the capacity of states to adapt to a changing diplomatic environment.[10]

The notion of state transformation is also instructive in making sense of the changing global environment and how it is conditioning the foreign policy behaviour of states. Proponents of this school of thought share the view that economic globalisation, and the neoliberal capitalist regime that drives it, has led to the hollowing out of the Westphalian state. As a product of the pressures of transnational capital, the emerging neoliberal state is defined by its propensity towards fragmentation, decentralisation, and the relatively autonomous internationalisation of the diverse sub-state entities to which state authority and functions have increasingly been transferred. In the context of state transformation, the conduct of foreign policy has become a major arena for political power struggles, as different constituencies within and outside of a country seek to defend and promote their transnational interests using the institutional processes of the state.[11]

Finally, scholarship on the increasing global significance of cities also offers valuable insight into the changing nature of foreign policy and diplomacy. Proponents of the notion of global cities, for example, argue that with the restructuring of global capitalism and far-reaching technology innovations, cities have re-emerged as strategic nodes of a globalising world economy.[12] As territorial sub-state units, cities all over the world generally lack formal foreign policy powers. However, because they command significant material and ideational resources, these so-called global cities, their networks and mayors, have acquired major influence in global affairs,[13] with the potential to either enrich or complicate the foreign policy agenda of their host states.[14]

10   *Ibid*.
11   Hameiri S & L Jones, 'Rising powers of state and transformation: The case of China', *European Journal of International Relations*, 22, 1, 2016, pp. 72–98; Hurrell A, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
12   Sassen S, 'The global city: Introducing a concept', *Brown Journal World Affairs*, 11, 2004, pp. 27–43.
13   Individually and collectively through various networks, cities and other sub-national governments have been very vocal in global sustainability debates, playing an active role particularly in bringing about the 2015 landmark Paris Climate Agreement. For more on this, see Cities and Regions, 'UNFCCC Climate Change Conference COP21: Paris, France, 30 Nov–12 Dec 2015', http://www.cities-and-regions.org/cop21/ (accessed 8 March 2019).
14   Curtis S, 'Cities and global governance: State failure or a new global order', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 44, 3, 2016, pp. 455–477.

3   The constitutional and institutional context of non-traditional diplomacy in South Africa

A brief overview of the constitutional and institutional context of foreign policy formulation and implementation in post-apartheid South Africa is necessary for a good understanding of the intersection between non-traditional diplomacy and the conduct of foreign policy in the South African context. As proponents of new institutional theory argue, the prevailing institutional environment is a key determinant of the choices and behaviour of political actors, shaping both processes and outcomes.[15] It can be inferred from various provisions of the 1996 Constitution that the primary prerogative to conduct South Africa's foreign policy rests with the president and the national executive. Besides empowering the national executive to negotiate and sign all international treaties, the Constitution also vests in the president the power to receive foreign diplomatic representatives and appoint South Africa's diplomatic representatives.[16]

However, a closer examination of the Constitution reveals a more nuanced picture in terms of the distribution of competences over foreign affairs. In particular, by requiring both houses of parliament to ratify all international agreements that are not of a technical, administrative or executive nature,[17] the Constitution accords a foreign policy-making role not only to parliament, but also to provincial governments through their representation in the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). In addition to these explicit entitlements, provincial and local governments can also claim a foreign policy role by virtue of the constitutional stipulation for consultation among the three spheres of government in the spirit of cooperative government.[18] Considering that these sub-national governments are constitutionally responsible for functions that are increasingly the subject of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations, such as health, education, local and regional economic development, and environmental protection, they should have a stake and be entitled to participate in the foreign policy process. Likewise, the requirement that 'people's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making'[19] can be interpreted liberally as a constitutional endorsement of the participation of non-state actors in the making of foreign policy. This is the case given that these

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15   Steinmo S, 'The new institutionalism', in Clark B & J Foweraker (eds), *The Encyclopaedia of Democratic Thought*. London: Routledge, 2001, p. 570.

16   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, sections 84(2) and 231(1).

17   *Ibid.*, Section 231(2).

18   *Ibid.*, Section 41(1h).

19   *Ibid.*, Section 195(1e).

actors, including business, NGOs and labour movements are increasingly affected by the foreign policy choices and actions of the state.

Over the past 25 years, the dominant interpretation of the constitutional allocation of competences over foreign policy and international relations has been inconsistent with the pluralist and participatory intents expressed in the various provisions of the Constitution outlined above. This has given rise to an institutional culture that has allowed successive post-apartheid administrations to centralise, in varying degrees, the making and implementation of foreign policy in the office of the president and the national executive, almost to the exclusion of other actors such as parliament, sub-national governments, civil society and business.[20] At the roots of this centralised institutional culture has been the dominance of the ANC in South African politics and the ruling party's preference for a centralised system of government. In this context, broad stakeholder consultation in foreign policy making has been a rare and inconsistent occurrence. And notwithstanding the expanding foreign relations capacity and involvement of various sub-state and non-state actors, as evident in the discussion that follows, there has yet to be a concerted effort to find synergy between non-traditional diplomacy and South Africa's foreign policy and international relations.

Elsewhere, countries such as the United States (US), China and India have deployed the concept of private sector development (PSD), understood as a government's efforts to catalyse links between its private sector and the private sector in a developing country for mutual economic development. The purpose is to integrate their respective private sectors into their foreign economic and development policies, albeit through different strategies and with mixed outcomes.[21] Consider, for example, the Power Africa initiative launched by President Barack Obama in 2013 as a public-private partnership intended to support economic growth and development by increasing access to reliable, affordable, and sustainable power in Africa. As Brendan Vickers and Richard Cawood have observed, 'while Africa may benefit from these projects, … many of these US-led initiatives are likely to benefit American companies and assist them to

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20   Ahmed AK, 'The role of Parliament in South Africa's foreign policy development process: Lessons from the United States' Congress', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 16, 2009, pp. 291–310; Masters L, 'Opening the "black box": South African foreign policy-making', in Landsberg C & J van Wyk (eds.), *South African Foreign Policy Review*, Volume 1. Pretoria: AISA (Africa Institute of South Africa) & IGD (Institute for Global Dialogue), 2012, pp. 20–37; Nganje F, 'Historical Institutionalism and the development of sub-state diplomacy in South Africa', *Journal for Contemporary History*, 41, 1, 2016, pp. 149–168.

21   Funde DF & CM Savoy, *Private Sector Development and Evidence of US Foreign Policy: Evidence of Indirect Diplomatic, Economic, and Security Benefits*. Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2015.

compete more effectively against Chinese operators in Africa'.[22] There is also a growing trend globally for governments to tap into the research, advocacy and networking capacities of a variety of civil society formations in pursuit of certain foreign policy goals. For example, in the context of a national discourse that frames Brazilian foreign policy as public policy that is subject to democratic participation and accountability, successive post-dictatorship administrations have made efforts to leverage the international interests, capacities and linkages of domestic civil society groups to achieve regional integration and South-South development cooperation goals. However, as Melissa Pomeroy argues, these efforts remain fragmented and poorly institutionalised.[23]

4 Non-traditional diplomacy in South Africa's foreign policy and international relations: trends, issues and challenges

This section is concerned with the major trends, issues and challenges of non-traditional diplomacy as an expression of post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy and international relations. We begin with a broad overview of the foreign policy and diplomatic role of an array of sub-state and non-state actors before using selected cases to illustrate the major trends that have animated this aspect of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations over the past 25 years. The intersection between South Africa's internal political transformation on the one hand, and the post-Cold War transformation of the diplomatic environment on the other hand, inevitably created a set of incentives and opportunity structures for various sub-state and non-state actors to aspire for a foreign policy and international role. For example, in the mid-1990s and early 2000s civil society groups, in particular research institutes, think tanks and NGOs, developed an interest and assumed a fairly influential role in the articulation of the country's foreign policy positions, as officials in the new post-apartheid administrations sought to tap into their knowledge and expertise. However, as Le Pere and Vickers note, the space for civil society involvement in the foreign policy process became increasingly constricted when the new elite in government became confident of their

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22   Vickers B & R Cawood, 'South Africa's corporate expansion: Towards an "SA Inc" approach in Africa?', in Adebajo A & K Virk (eds), *Foreign Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Security, Diplomacy and Trade*. London: IB Tauris, 2018, p. 42.

23   Pomeroy M, 'Civil society participation in Brazilian foreign policy: An analysis of its democratic quality', *Contexto Internacional*, 38, 2, May/August 2016, pp. 711–729.

policy-making capacity.[24] The contemporary relationship between civil society and the foreign policy establishment in South Africa has been described in terms of 'an elitist love-hate affair'. [25] This characterisation seeks to highlight not just the recurrent acrimony that defines attempts by civil society to play an active foreign policy role, but also the elitist nature of the civil society actors that have been at the centre of discourses on democratising and expanding the foreign policy process in South Africa.

The characterisation of the relationship between civil society and government in the domain of foreign policy as a love-hate affair also speaks to the double-edged impact of the transnational activities of the former on Pretoria's diplomacy. Two paradigmatic examples illustrate how civil society can both assist and complicate Pretoria's diplomatic efforts. The first is the much-cited case of how a broad range of domestic civil society actors, under the banner of the South African Campaign to Ban Landmines (SACBL), catalysed the global leadership role that South Africa played in the banning of the use and production of landmines. As Philip Nel and his colleagues have argued, the domestic and transnational activism of the SACBL both nudged the South African government in the direction of endorsing a complete ban on landmines in February 1997 and provided a moral base for Pretoria to legitimise its leading role in the multilateral process going forward, alongside other middle powers.[26] Conversely, the transnational advocacy of the Zimbabwe Solidarity Forum (ZSF), described by its convenors as a network of progressive South African civil society organisations, shows how civil society diplomacy, if not constructively and proactively harnessed, can complicate Pretoria's foreign policy positions. The call to isolate and censure the Zimbabwean government that underpinned the transnational activism of this social movement in the early 2000s was in conflict with President Thabo Mbeki's preference for continued engagement with Harare. This generated too much pressure on the South African government, causing Mbeki to accuse NGOs that were part of the ZSF of pushing the agenda of their foreign donors.[27]

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24   Le Pere G & B Vickers, 'Civil society and foreign policy', in Nel P & J Westhuizen (eds), *Democratizing Foreign Policy?*. Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004.

25   See Landsberg C, 'The elitist love-hate affairs: Civil society and South African foreign policy (dis)engagement', in Landsberg C & L Masters (eds), *From the Outside In: Domestic Actors and South Africa's Foreign Policy*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media, 2017, pp. 201–226.

26   Nel P, Taylor I & J van der Westhuizen, 'Multilateralism in South Africa's foreign policy: The search for a critical rationale', *Global Governance*, 6, 1, January–March 2000, pp. 43–60.

27   Smith R & E Tadesse, 'Whose Policy and Why Is It Foreign? Exploring the Impact of Civil Society Influence on SA Foreign Policy', Action for Conflict Transformation, August 2014, http://www.asc.org.za/action/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/whose-policy-and-why-is-it-foreign.pdf (accessed 2 April 2020).

The role of business and labour in South Africa's foreign policy more or less mirrors that of the other non-state actors mentioned above. South African big businesses, including state-owned enterprises, have been acknowledged by successive post-apartheid administrations as strategic partners in the advancement of the country's economic diplomacy and broader foreign policy objectives. Even so, there has not been consistency on the part of government to hold meaningful consultations with corporate actors on matters of economic diplomacy. This could be blamed largely on the divergent ideological orientations and interests of the government and the private sector.[28] What is more, the relationship between the private sector and the state has often been tenuous, particularly on those foreign policy issues that touch on Pretoria's vision for the African continent. Consider, for example, the fallout between former president Thabo Mbeki and sections of the private sector over South Africa's position on, and approach to, the political crisis in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s.[29]

Despite generally frosty relations with government, sections of organised labour have had some degree of influence on Pretoria's foreign policy and international relations. This is the case of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which enjoys a privileged position in policy processes in South Africa, by virtue of its alliance with the ruling party. COSATU has used its policy advocacy with various structures of government and the ruling party to influence South Africa's trade agreements, while also shaping its position in multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, given the federation's leftist ideology that is at odds with the government's neoliberal orientation, 'other more substantive proposals made by COSATU on trade have been largely overlooked'.[30] The same could be said of COSATU's attempts to influence South Africa's foreign policy in the region, with eSwatini (formerly Swaziland) being a classic case in point. Despite an understanding in both the ANC and government circles that greater political liberalisation is required in eSwatini, COSATU's campaign for Pretoria to isolate the absolute monarchy has not yielded much. As Nandile Ngubentombi has argued, this is due mainly to pragmatic considerations associated with eSwatini's location on South Africa's doorsteps, including the need to develop their shared water resource in the form of the Komati River. Strong domestic support for

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28   See L Mondi , Chapter 8 in this volume for a more detailed discussion of state–business relations.

29   Ayodele O, 'Big Business and Foreign Policy: Cog or Driver of South Africa's Foreign Policy', in Landsberg C & L Masters (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 154–156.

30   Mabasa K & L Orr, 'Labour unions and South Africa's foreign policy: The case of COSATU', in Landsberg C & L Masters (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 126–130.

eSwatini's cultural institutions from within the kingdom also appears to deter Pretoria from pressing for greater political reforms.[31]

The foreign policy involvement of sub-state actors such as parliament and sub-national governments over the past two decades has demonstrated a similar pattern, even if with little of the overt acrimony that has come to define attempts by civil society to influence South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy. As noted above, the hitherto dominance of the ANC in South Africa's political landscape, and the governing party's penchant for a centralised system of government means that the foreign policy role of parliament and sub-national governments contemplated in the Constitution has remained muted. For the most part, these institutional actors have deferred to the presidency and the national executive even on those foreign policy matters for which they are constitutionally empowered to have a say. Murray and Nakhjavani argue that except on environmental issues, provincial and local governments are generally not consulted, and do not exercise their right to consultations, when national departments negotiate and sign international agreements that have a bearing on their constitutional mandates.[32] In the same vein, using examples such as the government's refusal to grant a travel visa to the Dalai Lama in 2011 and Pretoria's failure to execute the international arrest warrant against Omar al-Bashir in 2015, Van Wyk has shown how the National Assembly, through its ANC-dominated Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation, has employed diverse strategies to position parliament as a mere supporter and promoter of the incumbent government's foreign policy.[33] Besides the overwhelming influence of the ruling party, capacity constraints on the part of these sub-state actors and the persistence of a gate-keeping mentality within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) have also played a major role in stifling the active involvement of parliament as well as provincial and local governments in the foreign policy process in South Africa.[34]

The limited foreign policy-making role of these sub-state and non-state actors should not be construed as reflecting a muted international involvement on their part. If anything, many of these non-traditional

31 Ngubentombi N, 'SA's foreign policy in Swaziland and Zimbabwe', in *South African Yearbook of International Affairs* 2003/2004. Johannesburg: SAIIA (South African Institute of International Affairs), 2004, pp. 149–151.

32 Murray C & SA Nakhjavani, 'Republic of South Africa', in Michelmann H (ed.), *Foreign Relations in Federal Countries*. Montreal: McGill Queen University Press, 2009, pp. 220–222.

33 Van Wyk J, 'Between Plein Street and Soutpansberg Road: Parliament and foreign policy during the Zuma Presidency', in Landsberg C & L Masters, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–95.

34 Nganje F, 'Sub-national governments and the localization of foreign policy in South Africa', in Landsberg C & L Masters, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–70. See Masters L, *op. cit.*; Ahmed AK, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–310.

foreign policy actors have compensated for their lack of influence on the national foreign policy process by developing an active transnational presence. As detailed below with selected examples, the autonomous transnational activities of these domestic actors have increasingly evolved parallel to Pretoria's diplomatic processes, although they have often been couched in a discourse of promoting South Africa's foreign policy objectives. Indeed, some of these transnational initiatives have over the years contributed to extending and deepening South Africa's diplomatic efforts especially on the African continent. Moreover, in pursuit of their transnational interests, sub-state and non-state actors have sometimes collaborated with traditional foreign policy institutions like DIRCO.

However, as would be expected in the context of a lingering ambivalent attitude towards non-traditional diplomacy, official efforts to better align the transnational activities of sub-state and non-state actors with the national foreign policy and diplomatic processes have tended to be half-hearted and largely ineffective. The institutional will and capacity to integrate constructively non-traditional diplomacy into the national foreign policy machinery has been lacking. A Consultative Forum for International Relations (CFIR) bringing together different sub-state and non-state actors was established in 2008 as an advisory body to the International Cooperation, Trade and Security Cluster, a high-level inter-ministerial committee charged with formulating foreign policy. The CFIR is also mandated to encourage greater coordination and accountability among relevant foreign policy stakeholders. Several factors have contributed to the ineffectiveness of this structure. First, given that its limited mandate keeps it at the periphery of the foreign policy-making process, the forum has failed to attract the commitment of stakeholders who aspire for more than coordination, and want a greater say in the formulation of foreign policy. More importantly, the inability of DIRCO to redefine its role in the changing diplomatic landscape and to move away from the traditional gate-keeping conception of the foreign ministry means that its role in the Consultative Forum has been construed by other stakeholders as one of controlling rather than enabling their foreign relations. Coupled with the weak leadership that the department has provided with regard to the forum, this apprehension has also contributed to rendering the CFIR ineffective as a coordinating mechanism.

In July 2015, the then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, inaugurated the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR), which was expected to serve as the principal point of interface between non-state actors and traditional foreign policy institutions in South Africa. At its launch, SACOIR was composed of 21 members drawn from academia, business, labour, and broader civil society. In addition to conducting research and

analysis, as well as convening dialogues on pertinent foreign policy issues, SACOIR was also expected to provide expert advice to key foreign policy institutions such as DIRCO, the presidency and parliament.[35] There is little information in the public domain on the work of SACOIR since it was inaugurated. However, available information suggests that the Council held an engagement with the National Assembly's Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation in November 2016, and then convened a series of dialogues with relevant foreign policy stakeholders in 2017.[36] The Council has since been dissolved as part of a foreign policy review process undertaken by the former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Lindiwe Sisulu. It is imperative that whatever structure is established at the end of the review process to fill the void left by SACOIR becomes an effective forum for aggregating and channelling the interests and perspectives of a variety of non-state actors to key foreign policy making institutions. What is more, as the principal link between non-state actors and the government on foreign policy issues, it is incumbent upon such a structure to reach out to, and create meaningful space for, grassroots formations, in a bid to exorcise the demon of elitism that has hitherto bedevilled state–society relations on foreign policy in South Africa.

In what follows, we draw on the cases of the international involvement of parliament, sub-national governments, and civil society organisations to illustrate briefly the nature, challenges and prospects of the interface between non-traditional diplomacy and South Africa's foreign policy.

4.1   Parliamentary diplomacy in South Africa's foreign policy

Since 2004, South Africa's democratic parliament has positioned itself as an international actor, which does not limit itself to providing oversight over the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, but engages directly on the global stage in pursuit of clearly defined goals. Through bilateral and multilateral engagements, participation in international

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35   DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 'Remarks by HE Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations, on the occasion of the joint launch of the South African Council on International Relations (SACOIR) and the South African Association of Former Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Chief Representatives, 16 July 2015, DIRCO, OR Tambo Building, Pretoria', http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2015/mash0716.htm (accessed 4 January 2019).

36   PMG (Parliamentary Monitoring Group), 'SA Foreign Policy Issues; Meeting with South African Council on International Relations', 16 November 2016, https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/23678/ (accessed 4 January 2019); JIAS (Johannesburg Institute for Advanced Study), 'South Africa's Strategic Role in Africa', August 2017, https://jias.joburg/2017/08/south-africas-strategic-role-in-africa/ (accessed 4 January 2019).

conferences, as well as conducting fact-finding missions in conflict affected African countries and deploying election observation missions, parliament has sought to complement, strengthen and influence positively the conduct of South Africa's diplomacy.[37] Parliament has demonstrated its emergent diplomatic capacity by progressively institutionalising its international relations. Today it boasts an International Relations and Protocol Division (IRPD) created in 2010 to play an advisory role and provide strategic guidance to parliament's foreign relations, and a 2012 *International Relations Strategy*, which outlines the strategic vision of parliamentary diplomacy.[38]

Despite the move towards greater institutionalisation of parliament's foreign relations, the potential of parliamentary diplomacy as a soft power resource in the service of South Africa's foreign policy objectives has remained largely underdeveloped. While parliament maintains diverse transnational linkages and is an active participant in many inter-parliamentary forums, including the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the Southern African Development Community Parliamentary Forum (SADC PF), it has struggled to develop an autonomous diplomatic agency that is consistent with the values of the South African Constitution, the strategic focus and principles of the country's foreign policy, or even the values and mandate of parliament as a democratic institution. For example, there is little evidence to suggest that parliament has leveraged its numerous bilateral relations with other legislatures to deepen and democratise South Africa's relations with foreign countries, especially those in its African neighbourhood. What is more, although the South African parliament engages in regional and global parliamentary advocacy on matters such as global socio-economic justice and democratising regional integration, success in this regard has been undermined by its own institutional and capacity weaknesses and its inability to create space for itself within a foreign policy machinery heavily dominated by the national executive. Of course, the nature of the political landscape in Africa, characterised by weak legislatures and an inordinate recourse to national sovereignty has also served as a major constraint on the South African parliament's diplomatic agency, especially on matters of promoting democratic governance and a people-centred regional integration project.[39]

In terms of the interface between parliamentary diplomacy and the national foreign policy, the South African experience is by no means unique, and largely mirrors that of other countries such as Australia and China,

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37   Masters L & F Nganje, 'South Africa's parliamentary diplomacy and the African Agenda', in Stavridis S & D Jancic (eds), *Parliamentary Diplomacy in European and Global Governance*. The Hague: Brill, 2017, p. 348.

38   *Ibid.*, p. 350.

39   *Ibid.*, pp. 354–366.

although the latter appear to have developed greater institutional capacity in the domain of foreign affairs. Despite the global surge in parliamentary diplomacy, parliaments, especially in countries with the Westminster system of government, have struggled to use their international presence to develop an independent foreign policy voice. They have nonetheless played a critical role in the execution of the foreign policies of their respective countries. As Jeffrey Robertson points out in the case of Australia, 'Parliament reinforces and enhances the executive's capacity, with parliamentary diplomacy providing the means to communicate political support for an initiative at the highest level … '[40] Likewise, Liwan Wang argues that, while China's foreign policy is still dominated by the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party (CPP), the diplomatic activities of the National People's Congress (NPC) have progressively become an integral part of Chinese diplomacy. Parliamentary diplomacy in this context does not only serve as a soft power tool to boost China's global status and promote understanding of the Chinese political system, but also supports Beijing's economic diplomacy.[41] In both the Australian and Chinese examples, greater coordination between parliament and the executive has been central to aligning parliamentary diplomacy with the national foreign policy. At least in the case of China, this coordination has been institutionalised in the National Security Commission (NSC), a policy-making and coordinating institution established in 2014 with broad and substantial powers in domestic and foreign affairs. The chairman of the NPC Standing Committee serves as the vice-chairman of the NSC, raising the profile of the Chinese parliament in the country's foreign policy architecture.[42] Such levels of coordination and institutionalisation are yet to be observed in the South African case.

4.2   Paradiplomacy and South Africa's foreign policy

Paradiplomacy, or the foreign relations of sub-national governments, has been a major feature of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations since the dawn of democracy. Despite remaining on the margins of the national foreign policy-making process, provincial and local governments have since 1994 increasingly added an international role to their constitutional mandate to foster socio-economic development in their respective localities. This is particularly true for South Africa's metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and

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40   Robertson F, 'Australia's parliamentary diplomacy: A study of the bilateral relationship with South Korea', in Stavridis S & D Jancic, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–292.

41   Wang L, 'Parliamentary diplomacy in the Chinese constitution and foreign policy', in Stavridis S & D Jancic, *op. cit.*, pp. 248–267.

42   *Ibid.*, pp. 267–268.

Pretoria, which alongside their mother provinces, have responded to the emergence and ubiquity of a neoliberal urban-based global economy by adopting an active international presence shrouded in a discourse of boosting competitiveness. Thus, from their humble beginnings as predominantly *ad hoc* aid-seeking adventures, which hardly bore any significant results and were prone to diplomatic blunders, provincial and municipal international relations have evolved into strategic engagements with clearly defined objectives aligned to local and regional development plans.

Provincial and local governments have used their foreign relations to promote their economic interests, and in some instances, they have attempted to localise the objectives of South Africa's foreign policy in Africa. Through their cross-border cooperation, provinces and municipalities located on the country's borders have also assumed an important role in the management of cross-border affairs, thus supporting Pretoria's regional integration ambitions. In recent years, metropolitan cities such as Johannesburg, eThekwini, Tshwane and Cape Town have also taken on the role of active participation in global city networks with a view to shaping global policy debates and action on urban development. For example, through their active participation in the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and the Local Government for Sustainability (ICLEI), these cities have joined forces with their peers globally to push for robust national and global policies that deal decisively with the challenges of climate change and sustainable development. They have also been at the forefront of efforts to localise global policy, initiatives and best practices in urban sustainability and climate change.[43] However, the degree of agency that South African cities wield in these networks remains unknown and is the subject of ongoing research. What is certain from this brief exposé of the nature and extent of paradiplomacy in South Africa is that provincial and local governments have strong incentives to become global players, and that over the past 25 years, many have progressively developed the interest and requisite capacity to engage in active transnational linkages.[44]

However, although provincial and local governments understand their internationalisation efforts in terms of localising South Africa's foreign policy, for the reasons outlined earlier, there is yet to be a concerted effort to integrate paradiplomacy into the national foreign policy and diplomatic framework. There has always been a clear institutional disconnect between

43   See, for example, Watts M, 'Global cities going green', *GreenOvation*, 22 August 2017, http://greenovationsa.co.za/2017/08/22/global-cities-going-green/ (accessed 7 April 2019).

44   Nganje F, 'Sub-state diplomacy and the foreign policy-development nexus in South Africa', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 23, 1, March 2016, pp. 1–20; see also Nganje F in Landsberg C & L Masters, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-69.

the paradiplomacy of provincial and local governments and South Africa's foreign policy. On the one hand, this fragmentation has worked to undermine the extent to which paradiplomacy has contributed to the localisation of South Africa's foreign policy by, for example, depriving provincial and local governments of much-needed institutional and technical support to engage effectively on the global stage. On the other hand, it poses a major challenge to the future cohesiveness of South Africa's foreign policy in the context of the changing political landscape and the growing assertiveness of sub-national governments both domestically and internationally.[45]

4.3   Corporate expansion and South Africa's economic diplomacy

Arguably, the growing internationalisation of South African private and state-owned companies offers the most opportunity for a positive synergy between non-traditional diplomacy and the national foreign policy, given the increasing salience of economic diplomacy in Pretoria's foreign relations. As noted earlier, countries such as the US, China, and India have increasingly found it convenient to partner with their private and state-owned enterprises in the execution of their foreign economic and development policies. Although there has been some collaboration between government and business on foreign policy in the South African context over the past 25 years, this potential remains largely underdeveloped. As Catherine Makokera notes, state–business relations in South Africa, including in the domain of economic diplomacy, have been characterised by high levels of mistrust and *ad hoc* engagements.[46] The resultant weak synergy means that South Africa's economic diplomacy and peace building initiatives in its African neighbourhood have often performed sub-optimally in terms of yielding dividends for the domestic economy.[47]

Both the National Development Plan (NDP) and DIRCO's White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy acknowledge and put a high premium on institutionalised and effective interface between business and government, as a precondition for successful economic diplomacy. There have been attempts to bring in the private sector into South Africa' diplomatic activities, notably through participation in state visits or trade and investment promotion missions to explore commercial opportunities. South Africa's membership of BRICS and the Group of 20 advanced and

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45   See Nganje F in Landsberg C & L Masters, *op. cit*., pp. 64–65.

46   Makokera C, 'South African Economic Diplomacy: Engaging the Private Sector and Parastatals', Paper 280. Pretoria: ISS (Institute for Security Studies), February 2015.

47   *Ibid*., pp. 8–9. See also Vickers B & R Cawood, *op. cit*., p. 43.

emerging countries (G20) also affords local businesses the opportunity to participate in these global forums, through the BRICS Business Council and the B20 respectively, with a view to both shape their agenda and network with their counterparts across the world. However, lingering mistrust between the government and the private sector, coupled with the diversity of, and disunity within, the South African business sector have undermined the effective institutionalisation of these efforts.[48] Moreover, as Sello Rasebatha suggests, the absence of a whole-of-systems approach to South Africa's economic diplomacy means that, compared to their counterparts from other BRICS and G20 member states, South African businesses are yet to fully explore and benefit from the economic opportunities that come with active participation in the working groups of the BRICS Business Council and B20 task forces.[49] It has also been suggested, with regard to Africa, that a well-coordinated economic diplomacy strategy would unleash the potential of state-owned enterprises to serve as a bridge between the commercial interests of the private sector and the developmental objectives of Pretoria's continental policy.[50]

4.4   Trade union internationalism and South Africa's foreign policy

Against the backdrop of South Africa's acquiescence to the neoliberal economic ideology in the post-apartheid dispensation, trade unions have emerged as significant foreign policy actors, seeking to curtail the onslaught of transnational capital and protect workers' rights and welfare. Similar to other non-state actors, the foreign policy space has largely been closed to organised labour. However, this has not stopped trade unions like COSATU and the Federation of Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA) from assuming an international role that is consistent with their domestic mandate. In some instances, the international involvement of organised labour has been undertaken in conjunction with, and with the support of, government, such as when unions such as COSATU and FEDUSA have formed part of South Africa's delegations to international conferences.[51] Such collaboration can form the basis for constructive engagement between trade unions and government, which could make South Africa's foreign economic policy and positions more responsive to the interests

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48   See Makokera C, *op. cit.*; Ayodele O, *op. cit*.
49   Rasebatha S, 'Active role by business in BRICS will promote investment', *Business Report*, 1 June 2018.
50   Makokera C, *op. cit.*, p. 10; Vickers B & R Cawood, op. cit., pp. 142–147.
51   Smit S, 'SA heads to the International Labour Conference', *Mail & Guardian*, 28 May 2018, https://mg.co.za/article/2018-05-28-sa-heads-to-the-international-labour-confe rence (accessed 5 January 2019).

of the constituencies that these trade unions represent. A similar expectation underpins the participation of three South African trade unions – COSATU, FEDUSA and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) – in the BRICS Trade Union Forum, which has a mandate to influence cooperation within the framework of BRICS in the interest of workers in the five countries.

Some of the international solidarity campaigns of trade unions such as COSATU also hold similar prospects for reinforcing South Africa's foreign policy positions. For example, both the South African government and the ANC have often ridden on the back of COSATU's solidarity campaigns with Palestine and Western Sahara to reinforce their position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the struggle for self-determination of the Sahrawi people respectively. Other campaigns, however, have had the effect of complicating South Africa's diplomatic relations by running contrary to Pretoria's foreign policy position or preferred strategy. As Khwezi Mabasa and Liesl Orr have noted, 'COSATU has, [through its international solidarity campaigns], been able to put pressure on repressive states where the South African state with its quiet diplomacy has failed to have the same effect '.[52] This was the case in April 2008 when, acting in solidarity with workers in Zimbabwe, dockworkers affiliated to COSATU refused to offload Chinese arms shipments at the port in Durban. The arms were destined for Zimbabwe. This act of solidarity in response to the post-election violence unleashed on the opposition by the ZANU-PF government is believed to have forced the arms shipment back to China, even though the South African government had been unwilling to stop the transfer of the cargo through the Durban port.[53]

As noted earlier, COSATU has also maintained an active campaign in the region to put pressure on and isolate the monarchy in eSwatini. While this activism, which has included attempts to shut the border between eSwatini and South Africa in solidarity with workers in the kingdom,[54] have occasionally served as an irritant to King Mswati and his administration, the trade union federation has recorded little success in influencing the South African government to adopt a hard line response to the curtailing of political freedoms in the absolute monarchy.

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52   See Mabasa K & L Orr, *op. cit.*, p. 142.
53   *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.
54   See Njilo N, 'COSATU wants to shut eSwatini border gates over Swazi workers' pay strike', *TimesLive*, 25 September 2019.

4.5 CSOs/NGOs and track two diplomacy in South Africa's peacemaking efforts in Africa

As observed above, South African civil society, in all its manifestations, developed an active transnational personality even before the dawn of democracy. Thus, while the relationship between successive post-apartheid administrations and civil society groups on foreign policy has witnessed ebbs and flows, the transnational activities and linkages of the latter have remained a key feature of South Africa's international relations over the past two decades and half. The scope of this chapter does not allow for a detailed analysis of the international activities of civil society groups and how these have interfaced with South Africa's foreign policy and diplomacy. It suffices to reflect briefly on the contributions and implications of the track two diplomacy of South African-based NGOs and other civil society formations for Pretoria's peace diplomacy on the continent. Given the complexities of the violent conflicts in which South Africa has had to intervene, the role of civil society in complementing official mediation efforts has been critical to South Africa's peace diplomacy in Africa. For example, through research, dialogue, and training, NGOs and think tanks such as the Durban-based African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) in Pretoria, contributed significantly to Pretoria's peacemaking and peacebuilding role in countries such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by clarifying the issues in the conflict, building trust among conflict parties and embedding official peace processes in wider societal dynamics and expectations.[55] In some of these cases, there has been productive synergy between track two diplomacy and Pretoria's peace processes, but this has been contingent more on personal relationships than on any institutionalised practice. Coordination between track two diplomacy and official peace diplomacy has also been largely defined by the perceived needs of government at any given time. This means that track two diplomacy has sometimes evolved parallel to official peace initiatives.

5 Conclusion: The case for a national diplomatic system in South Africa

This chapter has examined the emerging foreign policy role of sub-state and non-state actors in South Africa, against the backdrop of changes

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55 See, for example, Naidoo S, 'The role of track two diplomacy in the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict', *African Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1, 2, 2000, pp. 85–104.

in the agenda, actors and modes of diplomacy globally. We have argued that, consistent with global trends, parliament, sub-national governments, the private sector, civil society organisations and organised labour have all internationalised their activities. However, given the centralised institutional culture in South Africa, these relatively new entrants into the diplomatic space have had limited access to the national foreign policy-making process, and have instead found it expedient to engage directly in the global arena to represent and promote their interests. We have also highlighted the fact that the international involvement of sub-state and non-state actors, directly or indirectly, holds strong prospects for deepening South Africa's diplomatic experience and achieving its foreign policy objectives. However, this potential has so far remained muted, owing largely to weak institutional linkages between the country's foreign policy processes and non-traditional diplomacy. Harnessing the foreign policy potential of non-traditional diplomacy thus requires greater synergy between the actions of traditional foreign policy institutions and the activities of a diverse set of sub-state and non-state actors. As suggested in the recommendation section of this chapter, this can be achieved through an integrated system of foreign policy-making, implementation and coordination, which is able to reconcile the constitutional prerogative and political leadership of the presidency and national executive on foreign affairs and the realities of modern-day diplomacy.

For its part, this vision requires a new foreign policy paradigm in South Africa, one that is consistent with the changes in the global diplomatic environment and breaks away from traditional state-centric and exclusionary conceptions of foreign policy and diplomacy. An approximation of this new foreign policy paradigm is represented by the concept of integrative diplomacy, which describes the kind of adaptations that are required of the foreign policy machineries of states in contemporary global affairs.[56] Integrative diplomacy presupposes that while foreign ministries will remain at the centre of their countries' foreign policy processes, they would have to operate as part of a 'national diplomatic system' that recognises the international interests and capabilities of a variety of governmental and non-state actors. More importantly, the role of traditional foreign policy institutions would have to evolve from acting as gatekeepers of the imaginary domestic-foreign borderline to becoming internal coordinators of the initiatives of different domestic actors, while also facilitating the interaction of these sub-state actors with a host of external actors and networks across complex policy environments.[57] The

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56   Hocking B *et al.*, 'Futures for Diplomacy: Integrative Diplomacy in the 21st Century', Report 1. Den Haag: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, October 2012, pp. 5–6.
57   See Nganje F, March 2016, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

need for such as an integrated approach to foreign policy and diplomacy in the South African context is becoming even greater against the backdrop of the changing landscape of party politics in the country, which has seen the ANC progressively lose control of some sub-national entities to opposition parties. Some observers have suggested that these developments will usher in a more antagonistic model of paradiplomacy.[58] However, our view, backed by the most recent theoretical literature on the foreign relations of sub-national governments and the South African experience over the past decade,[59] is that the rise to power of opposition parties in provincial and local governments does not in itself constitute a threat to cooperative relations between the national and sub-national governments on foreign affairs. As Panayotis Soldatos had observed three decades ago, [60]it is the absence of effective representative and coordinating institutions at the national level that gives rise to foreign policy fragmentation.

5.1   Policy recommendations

Based on the analysis made in this chapter, we make the following policy recommendations to give expression to the idea of integrative diplomacy in the South African context:

- As chief custodian of South Africa's foreign policy and international relations, the presidency should assume responsibility for engendering and coordinating a national diplomatic system that gives expression to the paradigm shift suggested above. This role could be executed through three key structures overseen and coordinated from the presidency with the assistance of DIRCO. First, the agenda of the statutory Presidential Coordinating Council should be expanded to include foreign policy issues, with a view to allowing this structure to also serve as a high-level intergovernmental political forum on foreign affairs. Second, a reconstituted Consultative Forum on International Relations should be convened at the director-general level with a revised mandate to deliberate substantive foreign policy issues that affect provincial and local governments, national government departments and other sub-state actors. The third coordinating structure of South Africa's

58   See, for example, Mkhabela P, 'DA's confusion over Israel highlights SA's foreign policy chaos', *News24*, 14 June 2018.
59   See, for example, Thatam M, 'Paradiplomats Against the State: Explaining Conflict in State and Sub-state Interest Representation in Brussels', *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(1), 2013, 63-94.
60   Soldatos P, "An Explanatory Framework for the Study of Federated States as Foreign Policy Actors", in Michelmann J & Soldatos P (eds), *Federalism and International Relations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990, pp.34-53.

national diplomatic system could take the form of a reconstituted South African Council on International Relations, which should serve as a conduit for a broad range of non-state actors to shape foreign policy discourses and actions.

- It is also imperative for DIRCO to review its training for diplomats, to ensure that the latter are equipped with the knowledge and skills needed to navigate the new diplomatic terrain, which requires envoys to be astute in the art of networking with, and information-gathering from, a growing cast of international actors and across diverse policy issues. This requirement should also be mainstreamed into the department's recruitment process with a view to engendering a new generation of career diplomats who are fit for purpose. Such training should also be extended to officials responsible for international relations in provincial and local governments, as provided for in Article 7(4) of the Foreign Service Bill.[61]

- The South African parliament needs to strengthen its technical and institutional capacity for engaging in international relations, as a prerequisite for enhancing its role in the country's foreign policy process. One way to do it is for parliament to tap into the research and training capacities of universities, think tanks and DIRCO's Diplomatic Academy. Of course, enhancing parliament's agency in foreign policy would also require MPs to develop a culture of working across party lines.

- To address the challenges associated with an uncoordinated economic diplomacy approach, the government should establish a National Economic Diplomacy Forum, under the auspices of the Minister in the Presidency for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation. This should bring together all relevant departments and agencies involved in South Africa's economic diplomacy, as well as the representatives of the private sector and SOEs.

- Consideration should also be given to the idea of transforming South African embassies and consulates in strategic foreign capitals into a 'South Africa House', which will house representatives of different state and non-state entities with business operations in a specific country or region. This would not only contribute to pooling the resources and expertise of these entities but could also contribute to bringing greater synergy to South Africa's international relations.

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61   DIRCO, 'Foreign Service Bill', http://www.dirco.gov.za/department/foreign_service_bill_2018.pdf (accessed 9 October 2019). Since the chapter was completed the Bill was signed into law in May 2020.