

CHAPTER 1

DEFINING A SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 2020s: CHALLENGES, CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

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We will reiterate the centrality of the African continent to our foreign policy. The essence of our foreign policy is to improve the living conditions of South Africans and contribute to the wellbeing of our fellow Africans as well as all those who are yearning for peace, human security and prosperity in the world.

– Naledi Pandor, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, July 2019¹

From the advent of the democratic era in 1994 through to the early 2000s, South Africa was a highly respected actor in international affairs. During that period, the country's foreign policy appeared to be driven by a strategic vision that motivated and guided the decisions and actions of its foreign policy officials. It provided thought leadership and effectively wielded soft power in regional and global forums. It used its authority to promote the country as a leader in Africa and the Global South. The country played a significant role in promoting peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi and its efforts contributed to a short-lived political settlement in Zimbabwe. President Thabo Mbeki played the leading role in the creation of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). South Africa was invited to join the G20 and used its membership to promote African interests and the reform of global economic governance. It hosted major international meetings such as the UN conferences on racism (2001), sustainable development (2002) and climate change (2011).

Today while the country still carries weight, its international stature has declined. Many of its earlier successes are now tarnished. The norm entrepreneurship and innovation that characterised the early post-

¹ DIRCO (Department of International Relations and Cooperation), 'Media statement by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Dr Naledi Pandor, on the occasion of the budget vote speech, 11 July 2019, Imbizo Media Centre, Parliament, Cape Town', <http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2019/pand0711.htm> (accessed 10 January 2020).

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apartheid South Africa's foreign policy have disappeared. Its position as Africa's leading economy and voice in international affairs is increasingly being challenged by other African states.

There are many domestic and international reasons for this decline. Domestically, the country's international position has been undermined by the corruption of the political class, a persistently weak economy, episodes of xenophobia, and the government's failure to deal effectively with apartheid's legacy of poverty, inequality and unemployment. Internationally, the country has been harmed by its inept management of such episodes as its UN Security Council vote on Libya in 2011, the visit of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in 2015, and the undermining of the SADC Tribunal in 2012.

The global situation, of course, has not helped. When South Africa rejoined the international community in 1994, it was in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, the Cold War had ended, the US was the undisputed global hegemon, the 12-member European Community had just become the European Union, and the world was still reeling from the shock of the Rwandan genocide, which took place as South Africans were going to the polls in April 1994. Liberal democracy and free markets were being hailed as the victors of history. Even China, which was just beginning its unprecedented economic rise, was adopting market-oriented economic reforms. Russia regarded its erstwhile enemy, the West, as its partner both politically and economically in building a 'common European home'.² The US economy made up 26.3% of global GDP, while China's was still only 2%. In other words, the US share in the global economy was 12.9 times that of China.³ A number of African states were beginning to democratise, but many were also still smarting from the consequences of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes. The South African economy was 24.7% of the continent's GDP.⁴

The 1990s were the decade of optimism, vibrant multilateralism and norm development.⁵ The first Earth Summit had taken place in Rio de

2 Mikhail Gorbachev referred to 'a common European home' in a speech he gave to the Council of Europe in 1989. See Gorbachev M, 'Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev', in PACE (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe), *Official Report: Forty-first Ordinary Session, 8–12 May and 3–7 July, Volume I, Sittings 1 to 9*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1990, pp. 197–205.

3 Scott M & C Sam, 'Here's how fast China's economy is catching up to the US', *Bloomberg*, 21 May 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-us-vs-china-economy/> (accessed 16 January 2020).

4 World Bank, 'ICT tradeMap', <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups> (accessed 5 September 2019).

5 See, for example, D Bradlow & C Grossman, 'Are we being propelled to a people-centred transnational legal order?', *American University International Law Review*, 9, 1, 1993, pp. 1–25.

Janeiro two years earlier and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change only entered into force in March 1994. States appeared to be making progress on the environment. In 1997, they signed the Kyoto Protocol, which was expected to help implement the UNFCCC and help the world deal with the threat of climate change. The international community negotiated the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court in 1998. The UN was promoting the concept of the responsibility to protect in order to limit the risk of a repeat of tragedies like the genocide in Rwanda and the carnage in the former Yugoslavia.

The international community also appeared to have made considerable progress in dealing with infectious diseases and was beginning to focus on other sources of public health risks. In 1995 the International Health Regulations were revised for the first time since 1969 to cover a broad range of public health risks regardless of the source.⁶ During the 1990s, all epidemics except HIV/AIDS were confined to individual countries or regions.⁷ While HIV/AIDs had – and continues to have – tragic and devastating consequences in many countries, including South Africa, the 1990s was also a decade in which considerable progress was made in fighting the disease. The cause of the disease was identified and the first treatments for HIV/AIDS were developed.⁸

Today, we live in a very different world. It is characterised by rising global tensions and increasing pressure on the institutional arrangements for global governance. The threat of climate change that motivated the first Earth Summit has become a reality. In many parts of the world, including Southern Africa, extreme weather events have become more frequent. Parts of the world are experiencing such environmental stress that the environment is now a cause of conflict and of a growing number of environmental refugees.

Technologically, we are living through a new, fourth, industrial revolution. While it offers many opportunities, it also threatens to destroy millions of jobs. It is also creating so many new opportunities for states and private corporations to monitor individual conduct and preferences that commentators are beginning to refer to a new surveillance form of capitalism.⁹ While the new technologies facilitate social communication,

⁶ See WHO (World Health Organization), Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 'International health regulations (IHR)', <http://www.emro.who.int/international-health-regulations/about/background.html> (accessed 24 March 2020).

⁷ See Wikipedia, 'List of epidemics', https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_epidemics (accessed 24 March 2020).

⁸ See HIV.gov, 'A timeline of HIV and Aids', <https://www.hiv.gov/hiv-basics/overview/history/hiv-and-aids-timeline> (accessed 24 March 2020).

⁹ Shoshana Zuboff describes surveillance capitalism as being about more than just corporate governance or market power. She contends that it is about an entirely new

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they also have the potential to weaken social bonds and exacerbate social tensions.

China is now the second largest economy in the world and the most important trading nation. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), in 2018 China accounted for one-third of global GDP growth. The size of the US economy in the same year was \$20.49 trillion (23.8% of global GDP), while China's was \$13.61 trillion (15.9% of global GDP).¹⁰ China is edging closer to the US every year.¹¹ It is estimated that by 2030 China will be the world's largest economy.¹² Today, China is also a leader in technological innovation.

The US, while still the most powerful country in the world, is turning inwards and away from its global leadership role. This is leaving a gap in global governance which is driving other nations to try and take the lead in dealing with complex global conflicts, albeit without the same capacities and resources. The US's international standing and its soft power have also been undermined by the global financial crisis and the unpredictability of its international relations. The US is also withdrawing from key international agreements dealing with such issues as climate change and nuclear weapons and from international forums dealing with human rights and education, science and culture. The resulting shifts in global power are generating uncertainty and are beginning to undermine global governance arrangements in both the security and the economic areas. These developments are suggestive of Ian Bremmer's 'G-Zero' world, which he defines as one 'in which no single country or durable alliance of countries can meet the challenges of global leadership'.¹³

Global health has also become more complicated. Since 2000, there have been a number of epidemics that are global in their reach. These have involved such diseases as SARS, MERS, Zika, Ebola, mumps and, most

logic of accumulation, the consequences of which reach beyond the conventional territory of the private firm and undermine democracy from above and below. Zuboff S, *The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2019.

- 10 Desgardins J, 'The \$86 trillion world economy – in one chart', WEF (World Economic Forum), 10 September 2019, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/fifteen-countries-represent-three-quarters-total-gdp/> (accessed 20 February 2020).
- 11 Lee Y, 'The rise of China as a global superpower', CNBC, 23 September 2019, <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/24/how-much-chinas-economy-has-grown-over-the-last-70-years.html> (accessed 23 January 2020).
- 12 WEF, 'This is what China's economy looks like in 2018 – in 6 charts', 7 August 2018, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/china-s-economic-outlook-in-six-charts/> (accessed 2 April 2020).
- 13 Bremmer I, *Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World*. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2012, p. 1.

recently, COVID-19.¹⁴ In each case, these diseases have severely strained the health services of the affected countries and exposed the limited international capacity to manage international health crises.

The dramatic changes over the past quarter century have made foreign policy more complex and challenging for all states. They are expanding the range of issues that countries need to consider in their foreign policy making and implementation and increasing the number of forums, institutions, and actors with whom each country must engage in order to operate effectively on the international stage.

Over the course of the current decade, all countries will need to adopt positions on issues such as: What can the country do to create an international regime that helps it deal with the consequences of climate change? How should the country deal with the opportunities and threats created by social media, the shifts in the balance of geostrategic power, and the changing nature of sovereignty in international relations? How should foreign policy makers deal with sub-national governments and non-state actors such as, businesses, non-governmental organisations, academia and think tanks, and the faith and community-based organisations who are also involved in and interested in international affairs? Can the current global governance arrangements be reformed so that they can effectively manage the challenges that the world is likely to face over the next decade? Are the state's institutional arrangements for making and implementing foreign policy adequate or do they need to be adjusted to be more responsive to the changing international environment? In addition, while states are often compelled to follow incompatible objectives,¹⁵ they need to articulate a clear strategic vision, based on their national interest, that can guide their decisions and actions on the international stage. This can arise from the state's constitutional order or from its political process.

In the first years after the end of apartheid South Africa appeared to have a clear international relations strategy based on a vision of its national interests. However, over the past decade, a number of analysts have suggested that South African foreign policy is merely responsive to events and that it lacks a coherent strategy.¹⁶

The purpose of this volume is to help the country regain its sense of international purpose. It seeks to identify some of the lessons that can be learned from a review of South Africa's international relations over the

14 See Wikipedia, *op. cit.*

15 Holsti KJ, *International Politics: A framework for analysis*, (fourth edition). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983, p.125.

16 Pikoli Z, 'South Africa and the world in 2019', *Daily Maverick*, 29 November 2019, <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2019-11-29-south-africa-and-the-world-in-2019/> (accessed 8 December 2019).

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last quarter century and makes suggestions on how South Africa could respond to the international challenges it is likely to face over the next decade. It is by no means comprehensive, but it is intended to contribute to a conversation about how the country can derive maximum advantage from its international engagements in a multipolar, highly volatile, interdependent and complex world.

Some of the policy relevant questions that the subsequent chapters will explore include:

- How should South Africa define its national interest and what role should this play in determining South Africa's foreign policy priorities?
- What role should South Africa's international economic diplomacy play in dealing with the domestic challenges of inequality, unemployment, poverty and promoting sustainable development?
- What are the optimal institutional arrangements for developing and implementing an effective South African foreign policy?
- On what issues on the global governance agenda, should South Africa seek a leading role?
- What lessons can Pretoria learn from its peace and security agenda over the last quarter century?
- How can DIRCO engage most effectively with non-state actors in implementing South Africa's foreign policy imperatives?

This introductory chapter raises some of the key issues, relevant to answering these questions, that are discussed in the contributions to this volume and places them in context. In order to do this the chapter is divided into six sections. The first section describes South Africa's efforts to define its national interest. The next section discusses South Africa's soft power. The third section considers whether South Africa should be considered a middle or a regional power and how that determines its behaviour in the international realm. This is followed by a discussion of South Africa in the context of Africa. The fifth section focuses on possible South African responses to the challenges it will face in its international relations during the next decade. The final section provides an overview of the chapters in this volume.

1 Defining the national interest

History always plays an essential part in a country's international relations.¹⁷ It influences both the country's perception of its national interests and its view of the relationship between its foreign policy and its domestic priorities.

The national interest is used by commentators in two senses. The first refers to the long-term foreign policy goals of a country. These goals are based on the geographic, economic, military, social, cultural, religious, constitutional, historical and environmental characteristics of the country. They therefore change slowly and survive changes in government.

The second sense ties the concept of the national interest to the specific policy objectives articulated by the government of the day. According to this view, national interests 'are not metaphysical qualities that belong to a state and that are independent of whom the government is and how it governs'.¹⁸ Thus, this conception posits that the government of the day 'formulates foreign policy goals' based on its political agenda.¹⁹ The government may also use the term 'national interest' to justify an unpopular action by telling citizens that it was done in the national interest.²⁰

In this volume, the term national interest is used in the first sense. Thus, we contend that, while the priorities of the government of the day are important, they are not the only factor that should guide foreign policy. Every governing party should be constrained by the overarching framework of the constitution and its values. This is important because the constitution is an outgrowth of a country's social, political and economic history and is an expression of the nation's values and aspirations. It also clarifies how the society wishes to allocate governmental responsibilities and authority among the different branches of government and thereby contributes to the institutionalisation of foreign policy making.

In the case of post-apartheid South Africa, the Constitution shapes the foreign policy making framework although the key foreign policy objectives are those that are drawn from the policies of the current governing party. When the ANC came to power in 1994 there was a fundamental shift in the country's foreign policy, that was the result of the 'impact of changing domestic values and the entry of new elites into

17 Whytock IA, 'South Africa's Home Policy and its Foreign Relations: A Study of Transitions Since 1990', MA Thesis, Stellenbosch University, March 2015, p. 55.

18 McGowan PJ & P Nel, *Power, Wealth and Global Equity: An International Relations Textbook for Africa*, 2nd edition. Cape Town: UCT Press, 2002, p. 103.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 102–103.

20 *Ibid.*

[the] political system'.²¹ The change from the apartheid government to the democratically elected ANC government was not simply a change in the governing party but a transformation of the political system. Previously the South African government articulated its foreign policy through the National Party's euro-centric, white and anti-communist lens. Thus, it saw South Africa as a developed country and an ally of the West. The ANC saw the country through a different lens: it was African, developing and part of the Non-Aligned Movement in the global system. This identity informs the government's interpretation of the national interest. It is also mirrored in its international relations.²²

There are two official documents that discuss the national interest. The 2011 foreign policy white paper makes four points about the national interest. First, it considers South Africa's national interest 'as being intrinsically linked to Africa's stability, unity, and prosperity. Likewise, the 1955 Bandung Conference shapes our understanding of South-South cooperation and opposition to colonialism, [both of which should be viewed] as a natural extension of our national interest'.²³ Second, it notes that 'foreign policy is not an abstract matter separate from domestic policies'.²⁴ This suggests that it sees foreign policy as having to contribute to addressing South Africa's significant socio-economic challenges around poverty, unemployment and inequality. This point is strengthened by the white paper's third point which is that South Africa's national interest is 'people-centred, including promoting the well-being, development and upliftment of its people; protecting the planet for future generations; and ensuring the prosperity of the country, its region and the continent'.²⁵ Fourth, the white paper notes that '[i]n pursuing our national interests, our decisions are informed by a desire for a just, humane and equitable world order of greater security, peace, dialogue and economic justice'.²⁶

The white paper does not clarify how DIRCO and the government should use this conception of the national interest to identify foreign policy priorities and objectives and to develop the strategies and tactics for achieving them. This is a task for DIRCO and the government as a whole, in the 2020s.

21 Habib A, *South Africa's Suspended Revolution*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2013, p. 170.

22 Sidiropoulos E, 'South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period', *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 15, 2, 2008, pp. 107–120; Alden C & M Schoeman, 'Reconstructing SA identity through global summity', *Global Summitry*, 1, 2015.

23 Government of South Africa, 'White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy', 2011, p. 3, https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/foreignpolicy0.pdf (accessed 25 November 2019).

24 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 11.

The other document that seeks to define the national interest is the National Development Plan (NDP). The document's long-term vision is that,

In 2030, South Africa, informed by its national interests, is a globally competitive economy, and an influential and leading member of the international community. South Africa promotes and contributes to democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and peace and security, within a safe, peaceful and prosperous Southern African Region and Africa, as well as a fair and just world.²⁷

This vision suggests that the national interest includes economic, security, political, and ideational elements. Consistent with the NDP's domestic focus, its priority is to address South Africa's significant socio-economic challenges around poverty, unemployment and inequality. It states that:

The main objectives in terms of foreign policy-making should be to expand regional, continental and African trade based on an informed understanding of the geopolitics of Africa: to develop a healthy consultative and practical relationship with South Africa's research and corporate institutions in order to deploy its foreign service more effectively in the pursuit of expanded trade and investment; and to improve the country's leadership role in regional and global affairs.²⁸

The document also emphasises that the South African business community and research institutions should be called upon to strengthen the 'country's bargaining power and enhance competitiveness abroad and in the region'.²⁹ Elsewhere in this volume, we argue that engaging more with stakeholders outside government in the development and execution of foreign policy is essential for not only the economic dimensions of international relations but also for the political and security aspects.

In the foreign policy context, the national interest must also address national security, the values on which the global political and economic order should be built and the country's views on the institutional architecture for regional and global governance – something that the white paper recognises.

In a nod to the shifting economic power currents, it urges that

27 NPC (National Planning Commission), 'National Development Plan 2030: Medium-Term Strategic Framework 2014-2019 – Outcome 11: Create a better South Africa, Contribute to a Better and Safer Africa in a Better World', 2015, https://r7h9p6s7.stackpathcdn.com/wp-content/uploads/brandsa/2015/01/MTSF_Outcome_11_International.pdf (accessed, 10 November 2019).

28 National Planning Commission (NPC), 'National Development Plan 2030: Our Future – Make it Work', 2011, p. 240, <https://www.gov.za/issues/national-development-plan-2030> (accessed 5 November 2019).

29 *Ibid.*, p. 237.

While our regional priorities are important, South African policy-making should not lose sight of the emergence and increased influence of countries like Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela³⁰ in global political economic affairs. As it goes, Turkey is expanding its presence in Africa at a rapid pace. It is also important to bear in mind that the tilt from West to East [...] will necessarily be a long-term process in the sense that Europe, North America and Japan may continue to be powerful political economic forces in the world for at least the next 20 to 30 years.³¹

The National Planning Commission recommended that a high-level, high-impact task team be ‘urgently’ convened to investigate South Africa’s foreign relations. It highlighted three areas on which such a panel should focus: South Africa’s national interest; South Africa in the context of African geopolitics; and South Africa’s role in the world, especially in BRICS and in multilateral relations.³²

The NDP indicated further that the country should define the national interest and its obligations to the international community in relation to ‘sustainability of the natural environment, the global economy, the international flow of migrants, human freedom and international cooperation’.³³ A review of the geopolitics of the region, the continent and the globe would be essential to ensure that the country’s formulation of foreign policy was consistent with the national interest.³⁴ Although the NDP is now nearly ten years old, many of these recommendations are still relevant to South Africa’s international relations plans for the 2020s.

Since the NDP and the white paper were published, both the domestic political and economic situation and the international geopolitical landscape – and South Africa’s place within it – have changed substantially. This suggests that a new white paper on foreign policy should be a priority for the government.

This white paper should be based on an analysis of South Africa’s domestic economic and political trajectory over the last decade and how this has influenced the country’s political and economic prospects and its global and regional influence. This analysis must take into account the interests of all sectors of South African society. This means that it should be developed through a transparent and participatory process that allows the concerns of each sector to be fairly heard and adequately understood

³⁰ The reference to Venezuela is interesting here in light of the economic and political instability that has engulfed the country in recent years.

³¹ NPC, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 240–241.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 236.

³⁴ It should be noted that the NDP specifically discusses geopolitics in regard to regional integration. See *ibid.*, p. 241. However, the point is generally relevant to the issue of defining the national interest.

by the country's foreign policy makers. This will help the government identify the winners and losers associated with each possible policy option and work out how to fairly manage the inevitable trade-offs. In addition, the choices and priorities will have to be assessed in the context of a much more limited state resource base that will constrain aspirations for an expansive foreign policy.

In 2018, the then Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Sisulu took a possible first step towards drafting such a white paper when she appointed a panel of experts to undertake a review of South Africa's foreign policy since the advent of democracy. The rationale was the need to respond to the changed domestic, regional and global context, assess the strengths and weaknesses of the country's foreign policy and suggest interventions 'to make a contribution towards a world that is humane, just and equitable for all the people'.³⁵ The review was critical of how South Africa had conducted its foreign policy in the last decade, noting the connection 'between the decline of South Africa's external influence and the negative tendencies that have bedevilled our national politics'.³⁶ Institutional challenges were also noted and the review posed some useful questions such as whether South Africa was able to use platforms such as the G20 and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to advance the national interest, as well as the interests of SADC, Africa and the Global South. Reconnecting with the African Renaissance and Pan-Africanism were also recommended, while it also acknowledged the need to leverage technology to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. The panel submitted the report to the minister in April 2019. While it was frank in its assessment of the challenges, the review did not provide specific recommendations on foreign policy priorities and tackling institutional challenges.

2 South Africa's soft power

Much of South Africa's influence and power projection since 1994 have been a function of what Joseph Nye calls 'soft power', or the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.³⁷ It is

³⁵ Ministry of International Relations and Cooperation, 'Media briefing on the Ministerial Panel Report Presented by Mr Aziz Pahad, Chairperson of the Review Panel, Foreign Policy Review: A strategic reflection and critical appraisal of the orientation and implementation of South Africa's foreign policy', 17 April 2019, pp. 3–4, http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2019/foreign_policy_review_report0417.pdf (accessed 2 April 2020).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

³⁷ Nye J, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

the ‘ability to shape the preferences of others’.³⁸ South Africa’s soft power stems from two domestic factors: the nature of its political settlement and the nature of its subsequent constitutional order.³⁹ Both of these factors are still attractive to other nations and so provide South Africa with a source of soft power.

It is not clear that the government fully understands the sources of its soft power or appreciates its strength. In addition, it does not appear to have a strategy for using it to achieve its foreign policy objectives,⁴⁰ notwithstanding that Nye cautions that incorporating soft power into a government strategy is more difficult than may be apparent.⁴¹ The concept is mentioned twice in the NDP, and not at all in the 2011 white paper on foreign policy. In the NDP it is raised in reference to the role that science, culture, higher education, sport and environmental protection can play in advancing South Africa’s leadership and to the role of public diplomacy in projecting soft power.⁴² However, it does not consider that there are other possible sources of South Africa’s soft power. These include the attractiveness of the country’s general cultural milieu, the Constitution and the values that it espouses, its domestic successes, and the actions of its non-state actors, whether these are the private sector or NGOs. This expanded view of soft power suggests that South African soft power can wax and wane. Indeed, it may wane as its domestic political and economic problems grow and its lack of a coherent approach to continental issues and institutions becomes more obvious.⁴³

The Royal Elcano Institute produces an annual Global Presence Index that measures global presence⁴⁴ by looking at three main indicators: military presence, economic presence and soft presence. The index is

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5

³⁹ Sidiropoulos E, ‘South Africa’s emerging soft power’, *Current History*, May 2014, p. 198.

⁴⁰ Ogunnubi O & U Okeke-Uzodike, ‘South Africa’s foreign policy and the strategy of soft power’, *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22, 1, 2015, p. 27.

⁴¹ See Nye J, *The Future of Power*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011, p. 83. For one, successful outcomes are not in the control of the government, nor are the tools of soft power.

⁴² NPC, 2011, pp. 241, 255.


⁴³ See, for example, Maloka E, *When Foreign Becomes Domestic: The Interplay of National Interests, Pan-Africanism and Internationalism in South Africa’s Foreign Policy*. Ssali Publishing House, Sandton, Gauteng, 2019. (on line link: https://ug.linkedin.com/company/ssali-publishing-house?trk=public_profile_topcard_current_company (accessed 7 April 2020).

⁴⁴ Economic presence is measured by a nation’s flow of energy products (South Africa exports electricity to a number of countries in Southern Africa: Botswana, eSwatini, Lesotho; Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe); flow of primary goods; flow of exports of manufacturing goods; flow of exports such as services in transport equipment, construction and financial services; and stock of FDI abroad. Military presence is determined by military equipment and troop contribution. Soft power

calculated to ascertain the effective external projection of states irrespective of perceived reputation or image of these states.


Figure 1 illustrates the ranking of the top 10 African countries in 2018. In Africa, South Africa has the highest global presence. It is also ranked among the global top 30 each year between 2015 and 2018. Ethiopia's score is quite high, but the next few – Egypt, Nigeria and Uganda – all score below 50.

Figure 1: Elcano Global Presence Index 2018 – Africa



Source: Elcano Global Presence Index

considers migration, tourism, sports, culture, information, technology, science, education and cooperation.

Figure 2: Elcano Global Presence Index – South Africa

Source: Elcano Global Presence Index⁴⁵

Over the period 2017 and 2018 the Elcano index shows South Africa's soft presence declining substantially. This is partly attributable to immigration laws which make it hard to obtain a visa in South Africa. There has also been a fall in the number of foreign students in higher education institutions, coupled with the drop in tourism. The most recent records indicate a 2.3% plunge in the number of visas issued in 2019 from 2018. Despite this decline, it is important to note that South Africa leads the continent in terms of its soft presence through its education, technology and science. Its economic presence in Africa increased significantly over the same period. Its deteriorating military presence is due to the reduction in the number of South African troops participating in UN peacekeeping missions and a decrease in its defence budget.

In the next decade South Africa's foreign policy strategy should pay more attention to the country's soft power attributes and should articulate a view on how to harness them to enhance its influence in the international arena. In doing so, it must remember that one important source of soft power is how countries and their societies are perceived by other states and societies.

⁴⁵ Elcano, 'Elcano Global Presence Index', 2018, <https://www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/#> (accessed 2 April 2020). The increase in South Africa's economic presence can be attributed to the 1.2% growth in increased exports in the manufacturing sector in 2018, the major drivers being food, beverages and automotive sectors. In this period exports to China remained stable, exports to the US declined and exports to the UK increased by 27%.

3 South Africa: Regional power or middle power?

In assessing South Africa's global presence, it is useful to note that over the last 25 years, South Africa has been characterised in many ways: as a regional power, an emerging or rising power, a pivotal state, and a middle power.⁴⁶ Here we will focus specifically on South Africa's attributes as a regional or middle power. A regional power is one that acts as a regional peacemaker, is a regional source of moral authority and promotes rules and norms in regional politics that are acceptable to all states in the region.⁴⁷ In addition it must satisfy the following preconditions: it has the capacity to play a stabilising role in the region; it is willing to play that role; and its neighbours accept it playing the role.⁴⁸ A middle power operates internationally rather than regionally, is active in international organisations, supporting the objective of international peace and security while not seeking to impose an ideologically preconceived vision of an ideal world.⁴⁹

Schoeman characterises South Africa as an emerging middle power.⁵⁰ This means it has adopted some of the traditional attributes of a middle power such as Canada or the Scandinavian countries, while at the same time displaying characteristics of a regional power.⁵¹ However, she argues that South Africa finds it a challenge to progress from being an emerging power to being a middle power because of its domestic political and economic constraints and its failure to address domestic vulnerabilities.⁵² Black and Hornsby argue that the country's revisionist rhetoric does not sit easily with the traditional definition of middle power. Referring to Jordaan's work in this regard,⁵³ Black and Hornsby characterise emerging middle powers as reformist rather than status quo powers.⁵⁴ Yet they also observe that emerging middle powers 'contain more than one distinct

46 See Black R D & DJ Hornsby, *South African Foreign Policy: Identities, Intentions, and Directions*. London & New York: Routledge, 2017; and Schoeman M, 'South Africa as an emerging power: From label to "status consistency"?' *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 22, 4, 2015, pp. 429–445.

47 Flemes D, 'Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South Africa Case', *GIGA Working Papers*, no.53. June 2007, p.10.

48 Schoeman M, 'South Africa as an emerging middle power', in Daniel J, Habib A & R Southall (eds), *State of the Nation*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 2003.

49 Cox, RW, *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1996.

50 Schoeman M, 'South Africa as an emerging middle power', *African Security Review*, 9, 3, 2000.

51 *Ibid.*

52 Schoeman M, 2015, *op. cit.*, p. 438.

53 See Jordaan E, 'The concept of a middle power in international relations: Distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers', *Politikon*, 30, 2, 2003, pp. 167–169.

54 Black RD & DJ Hornsby, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

normative orientation ... “a split personality”⁵⁵. This can be seen in the way South Africa has engaged in international institutions such as the International Criminal Court and in its bilateral relations with partners in the Global North, such as with the UK where a residual attachment to a more Western identity and orientation is apparent.⁵⁶

In the 2020s, in a world that has become so much more uncertain and volatile, South Africa should seek to operate more effectively as both an emerging middle and regional power. The benefit to South Africa of acting as a middle power is that it will have a voice in global governance and can influence how the institutions of global governance evolve over the next ten years. In exercising its middle power status, it should play a more active leadership role in creating opportunities for global governance reform.

In functioning as a regional power, South Africa needs to play a more active role in the economic and political/security issues of the African region, in general, and the Southern African region in particular. This means that, on the economic side, it should take the lead in adopting policy reforms that help build regional value chains and should create regional trading opportunities. In the political-security terrain, it will need to strike a careful balance between non-interference in internal affairs and the imperative of good governance and stability. This will be a challenge in regard to helping to resolve the Southern Africa region’s biggest challenges. These include the crisis in Zimbabwe; and the potential threats to stability in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The difficulty now is that South Africa has much fewer resources at its disposal and has also lost much of its conflict resolution credibility.

The benefit to South Africa of playing the role of a regional power is that it will help the country address its own socio-economic challenges by building a more cohesive, stable and economically integrated region. In addition, such a role provides a focus and prioritisation more in line with South Africa’s resources and capabilities. This is particularly relevant in a time of growing domestic constraints. However, the country will also face a challenge in asserting its role as a regional power in light of the changing realities in Africa.

55 *Ibid.*, p. 6.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5.

4 South Africa in Africa


In the quarter century since South Africa returned to the international fold, Africa has changed significantly economically, politically and geostrategically. During this time, many African countries have experienced high economic growth and growing middle classes. A number have graduated from low-income to lower-middle income status on the World Bank classification. Others, however, have stagnated or succumbed to violence.

South Africa was the biggest economy on the continent in 1994, with a GDP of \$225.7 billion, or 24.7% of the total produced by Africa (north and south of the Sahara). Since that time, South Africa has deepened its ties with the continent. The tables in the appendix show that South Africa's exports to sub-Saharan Africa nearly doubled between 2001 and 2018, representing nearly 30% of South Africa's total exports. It is also among the world's top five investors into Africa.

The chart below highlights how the economic picture in Africa has shifted since 1994. South Africa lost its position as the number one economy in 2014 following the rebasing of Nigeria's GDP calculations. Figure 3 shows that in 2018 South Africa was the second largest economy after Nigeria (a position it lost to Egypt briefly in 2016). In 2019 South Africa experienced a growth of 1.2% compared to the continental average of 2.6%.⁵⁷ Its GDP was \$429 billion in 2018. Its Human Development Index rose marginally from 0.645 in 1994 to 0.705 in 2019. Seychelles (0.801), Mauritius (0.796), and Algeria (0.759) surpass South Africa in HDI terms.⁵⁸ In addition, there are rising economic challengers including Morocco and Kenya. Nevertheless, South Africa remains the most advanced economy. It has the most sophisticated financial markets, diversified economy and highest quality infrastructure on the continent.

57 World Bank, 'The World Bank in Africa', 15 October 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/afr/overview> (accessed 22 November 2019).

58 UNDP (UN Development Programme), *Human Development Report 2019*, 2019, <http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf> (accessed 22 November 2019).

Figure 3: African Countries by GDP (Constant 2010 \$ Billion) 1994-2018

Source: ICT Trade Map⁵⁹

South Africa's narrative has positioned it as an economic gateway to Africa. While it probably plays that part in the Southern Africa region, its geography (and more recently its economic challenges) undermine its ability to play this role for the whole continent, especially as there are now many potential competitors in Africa.

Geostrategically, the continent is rising in geopolitical prominence. Invariably different parts of the continent vary in importance in this new global chess game. Both the available opportunities and challenges have brought new actors to the continent (China, Turkey, the Gulf states) and have galvanised old ones (the US, Russia, EU). An important drawcard in this regard is the continent's youthful population. Some 65% of Africa's total population are between 15 and 35 years old. Such a young population provides the continent with a vibrant population who are willing to work and build their societies. Another attractive feature is that the continent is rich in both the resources (oil and gas) that are critical to the current global economy and those (cobalt, coltan) that are important in the emerging fourth industrial revolution.

However, the continent is also facing significant challenges. If its youthful population are not offered jobs and opportunities they will be

59 World Bank, 'ICT tradeMap', *op. cit.*

a source of tension and instability. This results in them contributing to migration and violent extremism both in Africa and abroad. In addition, the continent is being affected by the conflicts in other regions of the world. For example, the growing conflicts in the Maghreb and the Sahel, in addition to having domestic causes, are an extension of the geopolitical battles being fought in the Middle East. The violent extremism of those regions coupled with the constant movement of people across the Sahel and across the Mediterranean are resulting in them being the core areas of interest of the EU and the US. China and Russia are increasing their power projection and influence over events in Africa. This is leading to greater rivalry both between them and with the US and the EU. The latter's member states also see the continent in geopolitical, not just developmental, terms; and, as a result, are being drawn into local conflicts in a number of African states. Closer to home, since 2017 the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique, threatens to bring the scourge of jihadism to South Africa's doorstep.

This altered chess board has implications for Africa's ability to exercise effective independent agency. It also adversely affects the role that key regional powers such as South Africa can play in mitigating the effects of these conflicts. As a result, countries like South Africa need to be alert to any developments that may presage particular regional threats. They also need to consider what the changed regional and global circumstances mean for their own partnerships and alignments.

In this regard, it is important to note that politically, South Africa's prestige has been declining largely due to its domestic political troubles. These have also undermined its claim to exceptionalism in the eyes of other African states if not in its own. One contributing factor has been the recurring bouts of xenophobia (Afrophobia), which in 2019 elicited extremely strong responses from other African countries, including a decision by Nigeria to evacuate some 600 of its citizens.⁶⁰

Another factor contributing to this decline in prestige is that, although not necessarily due to its own actions, South Africa's original conflict resolution successes most notably in the DRC and Burundi, have proven to be less durable than originally anticipated. Moreover, other African countries have begun to take on more responsibility for stability in their own region. Sometimes they do so by working with the more effective African institutions that South Africa helped to construct. This development is to

60 Shaban A & D Mumbere, 'Xenophobia: South Africa calls out leaders of "degraded" African countries', *Africa News*, 21 September 2019, <https://www.africanews.com/2019/09/21/no-justification-for-xenophobic-attacks-south-african-president-auchief/> (accessed 15 January 2020).

be welcomed, but it also means that South Africa's role has changed over time.

A good example of the challenges that this creates is the role that Morocco is beginning to play on the continent. Following effective lobbying of African states, Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017. Since then, it has begun to deepen economic relations with many African countries despite their differences over Morocco's longstanding dispute in the Western Sahara. As one Moroccan analyst argues: '[...] the new approach is to start with the economy, create strong links, and then use those links for eventual political purpose'.⁶¹ In fact, Morocco's diplomacy in recent years has been successful in eroding African support for the Saharawis.

5 How should South Africa respond?

In 2010 the newly renamed Department of International Relations and Cooperation⁶² initiated a white paper process. The white paper referred to 'ubuntu diplomacy' that focused on 'our common humanity' as providing an 'inclusive and constructive world view to shape the evolving global order'.⁶³ The white paper did not explain how the Department intended to operationalise this diplomacy. It also did not articulate a clear set of priorities that could guide policy choices and the allocation of resources. The National Development Plan, which was published in 2012, also set out a vision for South Africa in the world to 2030. But while many of its recommendations are still relevant today, there is a substantial implementation gap.

Nearly a decade later, South Africa needs to take stock and re-examine its international relations.⁶⁴ It will need to factor in the very different geopolitical landscape compared to that which existed when the NDP and the foreign policy white paper were developed. It will need to

61 Messari N, 'Morocco's African Foreign Policy', IAI (Instituto Affari Internazionali) MENARA (Middle East and North Africa Regional Architecture) Future Notes, 12, June 2018, <https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/moroccos-african-foreign-policy> (accessed 6 January 2020).

62 Eddy Maloka, former Special Adviser to the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, notes on the name change from foreign affairs to international relations and cooperation that '[t]he ANC associates foreign policy with inter-state competition and posturing by states preoccupied with their security. International relations, in the thinking of the ANC, conveys a message of global outreach to make friends, build relations, promote cooperation over competition, and work with other countries, informed by collective interests, under a multilateral umbrella, towards a common goal, of a better world.' Maloka E, *op. cit.*

63 Government of South Africa, 2011, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

64 As indicated above, in 2018 former Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Sisulu initiated a foreign policy review.

consider South Africa's domestic economic and political trajectory in the last decade and how it has influenced the country's priorities and its global influence in the intervening period. And the country will need to identify the biggest threats to its welfare. These should be based on an analysis of the interests of the society as a whole. And not just those of its ruling elites. In the process there will be unavoidable trade-offs, but these need to be managed so that the losers are not unfairly prejudiced by the process.

A successful international engagement in the 2020s therefore cannot be divorced from a healthier economic and political trajectory at home. However, no country has the luxury of being able to put a brake on its international engagements until it sorts out its domestic problems. Consequently, South Africa will need to carefully identify its priorities, based on a rigorous analysis of its domestic situation, and the international and regional context.

Furthermore, its international engagements cannot only focus on commercial diplomacy. For both its own and the region's sake, South Africa will have to play a leadership role in the global governance terrain, which is critical for the provision and regulation of global public goods. This requires a careful calibration and selection of alliances with both states and non-state actors on specific global issues.

Another challenge is the fast pace of societal and technological change. This affects all countries and the way in which they conduct their international affairs. It also influences how they structure their foreign policy making institutions and the type of human resources they require. Non-state actors are becoming as demanding and outspoken on international issues as on domestic ones. These include sub-national governments (for example at the Paris Climate Change COP in 2015, approximately 400⁶⁵ cities participated) and supra-national entities (five regional groups consisting of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Latin America and Caribbean States,⁶⁶ were represented in their own right at the Paris COP); international organisations, non-governmental organisations; civil society organisations; multinational companies; and transnational criminal networks such as terrorist groups. Their actions have made diplomacy less the exclusive preserve of state diplomats.⁶⁷

65 Hsu A *et al.*, 'Track climate pledges of cities and companies', *Nature*, 532, 20 April 2016, p. 303, <https://www.nature.com/news/track-climate-pledges-of-cities-and-companies-1.19764> (accessed 16 February 2020).

66 UNFCCC (UN Climate Change), 'Party groupings', <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings> (accessed 20 February 2020).

67 Stanzel V (ed.), 'New Realities in Foreign Affairs Diplomacy in the 21st Century', Research Paper. Berlin: SWP (German Institute for International and Security Affairs),

The Digital Age is also changing the way in which leaders communicate and engage in diplomacy. It has democratised and made more immediate the means of communication. President Donald Trump has become the epitome of what social media can do for diplomacy and international affairs. For example, shortly after the killing of Iranian head of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, President Trump tweeted: *These Media Posts will serve as notification to the United States Congress that should Iran strike any U.S. person or target, the United States will quickly & fully strike back, & perhaps in a disproportionate manner. Such legal notice is not required but is given nevertheless!*⁶⁸ Irrespective of whether this statement is legally appropriate or sufficient, his actions suggest that ‘diplomacy’ has become very public. The pace of communications and information in the digital age can result in hasty pronouncements, decisions and outcomes.

On the other hand, they can also be powerful positive tools, provided diplomats are both empowered and able to adapt. Recognising this, countries such as the UK,⁶⁹ Germany and China are tackling the need for reform of diplomacy.⁷⁰ President Ramaphosa’s vision of a ‘capable state’⁷¹ should include careful consideration of what the Digital Age means for diplomats and their work in both selling the country as an investment destination as well as operating effectively in the global context.

Former British diplomat Tom Fletcher juxtaposes the traditional role of a diplomat to the envoy of the 2020s:

it used to be said that the best diplomats are either boffin, boy scout or assassin. No longer. The 2020 envoy is a lobbyist, leader, communicator, pioneer, entrepreneur, activist, campaigner, advocate. She has learnt from the best in those fields and has worked in several of them. She does crossover ... She builds game-changing coalitions and alliances across business, civil society, borders. ... She understands that diplomacy is not some kind of secret art form, concealed by jargon and titles. ... She bases herself less on structures and institutions than on networks ... She takes risks ... She does not believe that diplomacy is a job for life.⁷²

Building a ‘capable state’ in the Digital Age will need to factor in these various technological, geopolitical and skills challenges to ensure that the country has a strong voice and articulates its positions effectively in its region, the continent and the world.

November 2018, p. 29.

68 @realDonaldTrump, Twitter, 5 January 2020.

69 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Future FCO Report*. London: Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2015.

70 Stanzel V, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

71 It is the focus of chapter 13 in the NDP and was reiterated in President Ramaphosa’s speech at the 108th anniversary of the ANC in January 2020.

72 Fletcher T, *The Naked Diplomat*. London: William Collins, 2016, pp. 208-209.

6 Overview of chapters

The chapters in this volume cover a range of themes that are relevant to the country's political, security and economic engagement in its region and the world. They also address the changing nature of international relations, the emergence of non-traditional actors in diplomacy and the bureaucratic challenges of conducting an effective and coordinated foreign policy. By necessity the book looks back, to review what South Africa has endeavoured in the last 25 years in its international engagements. However, where appropriate, each chapter ends with a set of recommendations for the future, based on assessments of what the country's priorities need to be in the current fluid global context. As editors, we also encouraged authors, where possible, to co-author their chapters with young researchers. We believed bringing in the younger voices of emerging researchers and academics was important if we were to take to heart the need to have more intergenerational dialogues on international affairs.

Given the broad range of issues that are relevant to foreign policy for the next decade, the book does not seek to be comprehensive in its coverage. Instead, it adopts a thematic approach and focuses on some representative issues in each theme. The book is grouped into six sections. The first two chapters focus on the role of the Constitution and the courts in the conduct of foreign policy. The second section looks at the bureaucratic and institutional challenges in foreign policy making. The third section explores peace and security priorities in Africa and beyond, while the fourth section looks at the investment and trade dimensions of South Africa's foreign policy. In the fifth section the chapters focus on two key global governance issues – global economic governance and climate change. The sixth section discusses non-traditional diplomacy and the challenges and opportunities this presents in the 2020s.

South Africa currently has an opportunity to articulate a foreign policy informed by the Constitution and relevant for the next decade. In their chapter Klaaren and Halim recognise that while the Constitution does not dictate foreign policy, it has been demonstrated to guide how South Africa formulates its foreign policy. Actors empowered by the Constitution have increasing scope to create and implement foreign policy and the chapter discusses the roles played by the different arms of government (executive and legislature) and respective actors. The chapter also discusses whether the realisation of human rights may form part of the national interest and explores this in the context of peace and security, economic development and international institutional reform. The Constitution is the repository of South Africa's norms and values. These may not be legally binding but they are enduring and authoritative. It is these norms and values that 'tell us who we are as a nation and what we stand for'. The Constitution,

therefore, is an important factor in helping to define the national interest in international affairs.

It is not uncommon for South Africa's courts to have occasion to adjudicate matters involving foreign relations. Fritz's chapter examines two hallmark cases involving foreign relations powers, *SADC Tribunal* and *Kaunda*, decided more than a decade and a half apart. It concludes that courts will resolve challenges to the exercise of foreign relations power in much the same way that they respond to challenges to the exercise of any other type of public power – by reviewing for: a) compliance with the Bill of Rights; b) for legality; and c) for rationality. But where review is mandated for compliance with the Bill of Rights, the judiciary has limited scope to extend deference to the executive. That is the clear message of *SADC Tribunal*. However, there are potential costs to having an executive with foreign relations power that is subject to judicial adjudication. It constrains the executive's ability to engage in the transactions and trade-offs that are inevitable in international affairs—and that may ultimately help to promote human rights overall. In this sense, the courts help ensure that the national interest is interpreted in regard to more enduring concerns than those short-term interests of the government of the day.

Muresan and Kornegay's chapter explores the bureaucratic and institutional challenges facing foreign policy-making and argues that against the backdrop of heightened international complexity, South Africa's *party-state* foreign policy-making landscape has come under pressure. It looks at the legislative frameworks, the relationship between the government and the ruling political party, and the role of other actors in foreign policy making. It maintains that the country's institutional and bureaucratic architecture in foreign policy-making will have to evolve away from the existing monopoly of governing one-party dominance and toward a more inclusive process of policy-political discourse engaging other parties and all society's major stakeholders. The chapter, therefore, seeks to respond to questions about the optimal institutional arrangements for foreign policy making in South Africa.

The next two chapters explore peace and security related issues in Africa and beyond. In the first chapter focusing on Africa, Lalbahadur and van Nieuwkerk argue that Africa's primary position in South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy and security interest calculus has not altered since 1994. Yet, conflicts on the continent are becoming more complex with the rising threats of terrorism, climate change, and increasing incidents of political violence. Lalbahadur and van Nieuwkerk argue that while South Africa has played an active role in African security, its multi-dimensional peacekeeping interventions and other immediate peace and

security challenges lack a firm strategy to inform its peace and security engagement. South Africa's conflict management is assessed through three case studies, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and the Central African Republic.

Le Pere and Otto examine South Africa's contemporary security agenda and interests in the international arena. Their chapter highlights the issues and challenges this raises for the country, followed by the evolving security dilemmas, such as shifts in geopolitical power, growing environmental problems, and new threats such as cybersecurity. It then analyses South Africa's engagement with these issues and challenges through two lenses: platform-based engagement, and issues-based engagement. With respect to the former, Pretoria's role at the United Nations, and specifically in the Security Council is assessed through a focus on key votes and its support for UN reform. In terms of the latter, three major issues are surveyed: nuclear non-proliferation, environmental security, and maritime security. The chapter then goes on to consider the implications for the country's foreign policy based on its record as a global player as this has been shaped by the changes in the nature of peace and security, and the shifting balance of power.

More effective regional integration has always been articulated as a priority of South Africa's regional engagement. Regional cooperation and integration in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been greatly influenced by the behaviour and interest of South Africa as a hegemonic power. The chapter by Nkhonjera and Roberts draws on a series of studies to assess key issues for regional integration and the challenges of reversing de-industrialisation across SADC, through building regional value chains and industrial clusters. Their analysis underscores the interdependence between South Africa's industrialisation prospects and the collective growth and development of the SADC economies. However, there is little evidence that regional integration efforts have been coordinated across foreign and industrial policies. South Africa's policy orientation has tended to favour national rather than regional outcomes. They argue that South Africa needs to actively pursue an integration agenda that reflects the interests and incentives between and within countries in the region, as they relate to investments, infrastructure, and trade. Such an approach should help promote South Africa's own development and its efforts to address its most pressing problems. In the second chapter in this section, Mondi argues that the history of state–business relations can offer some useful lessons for the conduct of South Africa's foreign relations with other African countries in the 2020s. It is also a useful case-study in the role that non-state actors play in international affairs and how states engage with these actors in this regard. He sketches the evolution of South Africa's state–business relations and how it has affected South

African business's efforts to expand into other African countries. It shows that due to the power of the vested interests in both business and the state, there has been limited political will to structure effective state–business relations. He argues that this will have to be remedied in the future and the chapter includes some practical recommendations on how to improve these relations.

Davies, Fakir and Nagiah explore South Africa's climate change diplomacy over the past two decades and the strategies available to the country in the context of an increasingly uncertain global landscape. They assess the important domestic barriers South Africa faces as a result of its dependence on the Minerals-Energy Complex. Their chapter argues that since mitigation is made complex because of South Africa's continued reliance on coal for electricity generation, job creation and economic growth, adaptation must be prioritised at both the domestic and regional level. They further argue that given South Africa's significant soft power influence, it has the potential to drive its domestic objectives in the international climate change landscape, in spite of the current geopolitical changes. This chapter makes a strong argument that climate change offers South Africa good opportunities for using international affairs to promote both its domestic interest in sustainable development and its concerns with global governance reforms.

Efforts by South African policy makers to reform the institutions of global economic governance are the focus of Rose-Innes' chapter. Focusing on the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund, the first section introduces the agenda framed by the ANC leadership in 1994 and pursued for nearly two decades. It gives consideration to the contributions of Trevor Manuel and Pravin Gordhan, as well as the governance implications of changes in the economies considered systemically significant that they needed to manage during that period. The second section takes a forward-looking approach to preempting challenges and exploiting opportunities based on current events. This chapter provides an instructive case study on how effective exploitation of global governance reform opportunities can have positive domestic effects as well.

The rise of non-traditional actors in diplomacy is a growing feature of the 21st century landscape. Nganje and Letshele analyse the nature and implications of the transnational involvement of sub-state and non-state actors for the conduct of South Africa's future foreign policy, against the backdrop of ongoing transformations in the diplomatic environment. They further argue that while there has been an explosion of diplomatic activity in the post-apartheid dispensation on the part of non-traditional actors such as parliament, sub-national governments, private and state-owned businesses, and an array of civil society actors, South Africa's

foreign policy machinery has generally remained out of sync with this changing diplomatic landscape. The chapter offers some suggestions on how the country's leaders can engage more productively with these non-state actors.

The concluding chapter reflects on the current and prospective factors shaping South Africa foreign policy, the lessons learnt in the last 25 years and identifies strategic considerations that can help to shape an effective and forward-looking foreign policy. The chapter ends with a number of specific recommendations in the various areas that the volume has covered.

The book has an appendix which provides information and trends on the economic, social, and security situation in South Africa.

As this book goes to the publisher, South Africa and the world are in the grip of the virus, COVID-19, which was declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation. Countries around the world are in lockdown and the number of infections and deaths has been rising. The initial responses were determined by each nation for itself. More recently, there have been some efforts at a coordinated global response, spearheaded by the G20, the IMF and World Bank. The United Nations has so far played a very limited role in the global response. Thus, this global pandemic has highlighted both the deficiencies in the current arrangements for global governance and the urgent need for effective global institutions and governance arrangements to deal with such transnational threats.

It is too soon to know what the COVID-19 pandemic's long-term effect on the global system, will be. It is possible that it will accelerate two already evident but contradictory trajectories – on the one hand towards greater autarky, and on the other, towards greater efforts to strengthen the instruments for collective responses. In either case, it is clear that there will be a need for global governance reform. This suggests that in the 2020s South Africa should expend greater energy on promoting efforts at the global level to strengthen the global institutions and the mechanisms for effective intervention and support.